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Abstract
We estimate the probability of public sector leadership – defined as Granger causality from
public to private sector wages – in a pool of 18 OECD countries as a function of countries’ in-
stitutional features. We find that public-private sector causality results are quite heterogeneous
across countries. So, we investigate whether this is related to differences in labor and product
market institutions, and notably wage-setting institutions, across countries. Government in-
volvement in collective bargaining, bargaining centralization and collective bargaining systems
with predominant regional levels’ systems are positively correlated with the probability of find-
ing public wage leadership. Among the factors that reduce its probability we can underline the
impact of globalization and a level of collective bargaining closer to the company one.
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1 Introduction
Recent literature has documented the existence of linkages between public and private sector wages
and employment (see for example Lindquist adn Vilhelmsson 2006; Afonso and Gomes 2008; Lamo,
Pe´rez and Schuknecht 2013, 2012a, 2012b). In particular Lamo, Pe´rez and Schuknecht (2012a)
empirically analyze these linkages for a large number of OECD countries. They find that private
sector wages exert a stronger influence on public wages than the other way around. However,
there is also some evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting on private-sector wages
in a number of countries (see Pe´rez and Sa´nchez-Fuentes, 2011). This has important implications
for public wage policies, especially with regard to the EMU and small open economies, in that
not only private but also public wage setting are important for overall wage and competitiveness
developments. Wage spillovers from the public sector might lead to wage costs growing faster than
productivity in the private (including the tradable) sector.
Therefore it is of substantial relevance to understand what are the factors behind public sector
leadership and this is precisely what this paper investigates, namely the role of labor market and
other country-specific institutions in explaining the probability of public sector wage leadership. To
do that we estimate the probability of public sector leadership in a pool of 18 OECD countries as a
function of countries’ institutional features. Public sector leadership is simply defined as Granger
causality from public to private wages and causality tests are implemented on public versus private
wages using a variety of methods for the sake of robustness. We find that public-private sector
causality results are quite heterogeneous across countries. So, we investigate whether this is related
to differences in labor and product market institutions, and notably wage-setting institutions, across
countries. Labor and product market institutions are measured using a set of standard OECD-
based variables, a set of variables on wage-bargaining institutions in the euro area generated from
the information collected within the European System of Central Banks Wage Dynamics Network
(WDN), plus a measure of globalization and size of government (public employment ratio).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain in more detail the
empirical strategy and data used. In Section 3 we present the main results and in Section 4 the
main conclusions of the study.
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2 Data and empirical strategy
In this paper we define public sector leadership as causality from public to private wages1. We test
for public versus private sector wage leadership by implementing Granger causality tests in a VAR
framework. 2 Granger causality is one of the concepts of causality most commonly used. In short,
public wages Granger cause private wages if the former variable helps improving the predictions of
the latter variable.
Granger-causality tests are usually implemented on stationary and stable data (detrended vari-
ables); we borrow the approach from Lamo, Pe´rez and Schuknecht (2013 and 2012b) who consider
a variety of detrending methods, up to eleven, to remove fluctuations from a set of variables, among
them the ones of interest in this paper, namely public and private wages.3 They use a number of
standard filters that are described in both papers. The underlying assumption to detrending filters
is that aggregate cyclically-adjusted economic time series can be decomposed into a trend compo-
nent Tt, the so-called cyclical component Ct that fluctuates around the trend, and an unpredictable
random component εt, i.e. a given series yt can be decomposed as yt = Tt + Ct + εt . Most of
the detrending filters take out the trend component from the original time series, so that both the
cyclical and irregular components Ct + εt are taken as measure of the cycle.
In this paper we run causality tests using the 11 pairs of detrended public-private wages. In
addition, we test Granger-causality between pairs of original variables (i.e. non detrended). In this
later case we use a Wald test based on a lag augmented VAR, following Toda and Yamamoto (1995)
and Dolado and Lu¨tkephol (1996). 4 Formally, in all the cases mentioned, the causality tests can
be implemented by means of the following model that contains public sector wages, private sector
1The measures of wages in this paper is compensation per employee. Compensation per employee is computed
using compensation of employees and employment data. Compensation of private sector employees is defined as
total economy compensation of employees minus compensation of government employees. Compensation per private
employee is defined as private compensation of employees divided by total employees minus government employment
minus self-employment.
2Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2004) and Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2012a) explore a different concept of public
sector leadership, based on vector error correction models (VECM).
3The original data set, that is then detrended in the previously-mentioned papers is a standard OECD dataset.
4These authors show that a standard Wald test can be used to test linear constraints in this framework by just
adding an extra lag in estimating the parameters of the process. This approach is quite appealing because the least-
squared estimation may be applied to the levels of the V AR(p + 1) model. To carry out the causality test it is not
necessary to perform a VEC reparameterization of the process to account for cointegration, because the least-squares
estimators of the relevant matrices do not change due to the reparameterization.
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wages and expected prices,
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Et−j (pt−j+1)
+ εt (1)
where C is a 3x1 vector of constant coefficients, each Aj is a 3x3 matrix, p the order of the
VAR, and ε a 3x1 vector of random disturbances. wPUt denotes nominal wages in the public sector,
wPRt nominal wages in the private sector, and E(pt+1) the expected price level in t+ 1. If expected
prices at time t+ 1 are proxied by actual prices at that time, the corresponding equation for public
sector wages in (1) turns out to be
wPUt = C1 + a
PU
0 pt + a
PU
1 pt−1 + · · · + aPUp pt−p + A1PU (L) wPUt + A1PR (L) wPRt + εPU1 (2)
The way to obtain the observations for our dependent variable is the following. As in Lamo et
al. (2013, 2012b), we run (2) for each one of the detrended wage measures (and the non-detrended
approach), the two considered deflators and the 18 industrial countries in our sample (which yields
up to 432 observations). In those instances where public sector wage leadership was statistically
significant, i.e. public sector wages caused private sector wages, our dependent variable takes the
value of 1 (183 observations), otherwise it is set to zero (249 observations). Clearly our dependent
variable suffers from multicollinearity that could distort the standard errors of the estimates. To
address this relevant issue we introduce controls for detrending methods and deflator used and in
addition we estimate using robust variance and covariance a` la Huber-White.
Independent variables include a set of standard OECD-based variables of labor and product
market institutions, a set of variables on wage bargaining institutions in Europe, the US and
Japan generated from the information collected within the European System of Central Banks
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), and a measure of globalisation. The fact that the OECD data
base is not available for Greece and the WDN-based institutional data is not available for Canada
and Norway reduces the maximum number of observations from 432 to 360. Table 1 lists the
institutional variables and their sources. In addition Table 2 provides a number of descriptive
statistics for all the variables included in the analysis.
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3 Public sector leadership and wage setting institutions
The estimated coefficients shown in Table 3 yield the marginal effect of a change in independent
variables on the probability of public/private wage causation. We show the results for several em-
pirical specifications. In Column [1] we include the selected OECD labor market indicators, labeled
as 1) to 4), the product market regulation index, labeled as 5), the KOF index of globalization,
labeled as 6), an index of government involvement in collective bargaining, labeled as 8), and an
index of coverage of high coverage by indexation mechanisms. Then in Column [2] we include
some disaggregation on the type of bargaining mechanisms, by adding variables 10) to 14) on the
dominant level of collective bargaining (sectoral, occupational, national, regional, company-level).
Column [3], in turn, adds the public employment ratio (ratio of public to total economy employees)
as an additional control. Finally, and for the sake of robustness check, we show in columns [4] and [5]
the results for the same model but estimated for each deflator independently. In the latter respect,
the estimations in columns [1] to [3] do include deflator dummies as well as detrending-method
dummies, while the models in columns [4] and [5] do only include method dummies. However,
the estimations do not include in any of the cases country dummies, given that these would at
least partially capture the cross country institutional variation which we want to be reflected in
the explanatory variables. The findings confirm the importance of certain labor market and other
institutions in shaping public wage leadership. The following results can be highlighted.
First, some institutional features show a strong positive correlation with public wage leadership.
Particulary, they increase the probability of public wages Granger-causing private sector wages:
(i) government involvement in collective bargaining; (ii) index of bargaining centralization; (iii)
collective bargaining systems with predominant occupational and/or regional levels’ systems. It
is not surprising to confirm that the stronger the role of the government in collective bargaining
the mode importance public wage policies acquire. In addition, stronger bargaining centralization
between negotiating parties – being state-sponsored and state-imposed one defining features –
suggest a strong role for a wage negotiation benchmark, and this may most easily be in the public
sector owing to the higher degree of unionization in that sector compared to the private sector. Also
not surprisingly, more predominant wage bargaining at the regional level coincides with more public
wage leadership. Social safety nets and inter-regional redistribution – more or less prevalent in all
industrialized countries – may allow more of a public sector lead role as regions can externalize
at least part of the costs (e.g., higher unemployment leading to more transfers). A result that
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is admittedly counter-intuitive, though, is the one on occupational dominant level of collective
bargaining being positively correlated with public wage leadership.
Second, as regards institutions that reduce the probability of public wage leadership, the fol-
lowing messages can be underlined. On the one hand, stronger exposure to competition, measured
by the index of globalization, reduces the probability of public wage decisions influencing private
sector outcomes. Indeed, increased competition would result in market forces being more dominant
in wage setting. Markets also limit the leadership of public wages as market constraints are more
binding and firms have less scope to accommodate other influences. On the other hand, a larger
weight of the public sector is also negatively correlated with the likelihood of public sector wages
causing private wages. In principle this result seems to be counterintuitive, but it could be rational-
ized on the grounds that smaller, typically more unionized public sectors and with greater monopoly
power in certain sectors of activity, may be able to influence more the wage setting process than
in the case of big, more diffusely associated public sectors. Finally, a prevalence of company-level
wage setting is likely to focus negotiations on the specific (private) occupation or firm situation and
therefore less likely to coincide with a strong lead role for the public sector. Indeed, the correlation
between company-level wage bargaining and public wages causing private wages is negative, even
though the coefficients are estimated with low precision. Stronger national and sectoral levels of
collective bargaining are also associated with lower prevalence of public wage decisions on private
sector ones, a result that can be interpreted against the background that the broader the coverage
of wage agreements, the lower the pressure public sector unions can exert on it. As regards the
negative sign also found for national and sectoral dominant wage setting schemes, this might be
evidence that broader-scope agreements tend to internalize more the external effects of wage setting
across all negotiating parties, and hence, weigh less on public sector dominance/leadership.
In the sample used (1980-2007) the following variables turned out to be non-significant or only
significant in one of the model specifications. On the one hand, bargaining coordination that, ex-
ante could be expected to capture a similar effect as bargaining centralization. Because of this,
the influence of this variable might be captured by the latter variable of the dominant bargaining
level dummies, among which multicolinearity is likely to arise. As regards union membership, ex-
ante one may expect that higher union density might imply a strong role for a wage negotiation
benchmark and this may most easily be in the public sector due to the higher degree of unionization;
this intuition is not confirmed by the data. On employment protection legislation, one may guess
that stricter legislation gives unions a stronger bargaining power in the private sector, independent
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of public sector outcomes and, hence, one might expect a weaker influence of public wages; on
different grounds, one may also theorize that stronger protection legislation reduces the comparative
power of public sector employees, this being them typically holding per-life positions. The results
of model [3] tend to be in line with the latter argument. Finally, neither the product market
regulation index nor high coverage by indexation mechanism turned out to be significant in any of
the empirical specifications. The latter result is not surprising if one considers that a higher degree
of price indexation is less likely to be positively correlated with public than with private sector
wage leadership, as private wages, by comprising about 80% of countries’ wage bill, are a key driver
of inflation (this, in turn, determines the next round of wages increases – wage price spiral).
4 Conclusions
The findings of the paper confirm the importance of certain labor market and other institutions
in shaping public wage leadership. In particular, government involvement in collective bargain-
ing, bargaining centralization and collective bargaining systems with predominant regional levels’
systems are positively correlated with the probability of finding public wage leadership. Among
the factors that reduce its probability one can underline the impact of globalization and a level of
collective bargaining closer to the company one.
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Table 1: Institutional variables used in the analysis.
Independent variable Source
Index of bargaining coordination and centralization Ochel (2000) based on OECD
Employment protection legislation Allard (2005) based on OECD labour market
statistics database (lmsd)
Union membership/ employment Udnet based on OECD lmsd and Visser (2006)
Index of globalisation Dreher (2006)
Product market regulation index Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005)
Government involvement in collective bargaining DuCaju et al. (2008)
High coverage of indexation (75-100%) DuCaju et al. (2008)
Dominant level of collective bargaining: sectoral, DuCaju et al. (2008)
occupational national, regional, company-level
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable No obs. Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent variable:
Public wage causality 432 0.405 0.242 0.387 1.150
(value 1 if public wages cause private wages)
Independent variables:
OECD labour market indicators
1) Index of bargaining coordination 204 2.171 0.283 -1.030 2.858
2) Index of bargaining centralisation 204 2.071 0.342 -0.847 2.344
3) Employment protection legislation 204 1.828 0.625 -0.230 2.220
4) Union membership/employment 204 42.040 331.994 0.325 2.359
Product market regulation index
5) Product market regulation index 216 1.647 0.130 0.278 2.520
Other control variables
6) KOF index of globalisation 216 70.362 92.202 -0.660 2.560
7) Public employment ratio 216 0.169 0.004 0.657 2.392
WDN variables
8) Government involvement in collec. barg. 216 0.167 0.140 1.789 4.200
9) High coverage by index. mech. (76-100%) 192 0.125 0.110 2.268 6.143
10) Dominant level of coll. barg.: sectoral 192 0.688 0.216 -0.809 1.655
11) Dominant level of coll. barg.: occupational 192 0.188 0.153 1.601 3.564
12) Dominant level of coll. barg.: national 192 0.063 0.059 3.615 14.067
13) Dominant level of coll. barg.: regional 192 0.125 0.110 2.268 6.143
14) Dominant level of coll. barg.: company-level 192 0.167 0.140 1.789 4.200
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Table 3: Institutional determinants of public sector wage leadership
Method of estimation: Probit. Sample period: 1980-2007.
Dependent variable: takes the value 1 if public wages cause private wages.
Model Model Model Model Model
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Priv.cons. GDP
deflator deflator
OECD labour market indicators
1) Index of bargaining coordination -0.093 0.18 -0.004 0.21 0.08
[1.22] [1.52] [0.03] [1.27] [0.47]
2) Index of bargaining centralization 0.531
[6.08]**
3) Employment protection legislation -0.068 0.256 0.535 0.28 0.216
[0.73] [1.64] [2.65]** [1.27] [0.99]
4) Union membership/employment -0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.002
[2.71]** [0.86] [0.41] [0.60] [0.19]
Product market regulation index
5) Product market regulation index -0.263 0.225 -0.268 0.025 0.644
[1.21] [0.85] [0.75] [0.07] [1.67]*
Other control variables
6) KOF index of globalization -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.03
[3.91]** [2.63]** [2.06]** [2.36]** [2.79]**
7) Public employment ratio -4.129
[2.06]**
WDN variables
8) Government involvement in 0.328 0.702 0.874 0.736 0.851
collective bargaining [2.19]** [3.80]** [3.72]** [3.19]** [3.25]**
9) High coverage -0.029 0.021 -0.279 -0.074 0.141
by indexation mechanisms (76-100%) [0.20] [0.07] [1.04] [0.18] [0.34]
10) Dominant level of collective -0.86 -0.91 -0.741 -0.987
bargaining: sectoral [4.51]** [4.85]** [2.67]** [4.90]**
11) Dominant level of collective 0.427 0.475 0.349 0.728
bargaining: occupational [2.18]** [2.41]** [1.33] [2.63]**
12) Dominant level of collective -0.394 -0.402 -0.271 -0.409
bargaining: national [3.13]** [3.24]** [0.85] [4.29]**
13) Dominant level of collective 0.35 0.397 0.16 0.755
bargaining: regional [2.03]** [2.15]** [0.73] [2.90]**
14) Dominant level of collective -0.212 -0.147 -0.233 -0.244
bargaining: company-level [1.95]* [1.24] [1.46] [1.93]*
Number of observations 360 360 360 180 180
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
The estimated coefficients shown in this table yield the marginal effect of a change in the independent
variables on the probability of causation. The estimations include method dummies and deflator dummies.
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